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Abstract
Systems security engineering (SSE) is a complex,
manually intensive process, with implications for cost,
time required, and repeatability/reproducibility. This
paper describes BluGen, an analytic framework that
generates risk plots and recommends prioritized mitigations for a target mission/system environment based
on a stated level of threat and risk tolerance. The goal
is to give working system security engineers a head
start in their analysis. We describe BluGen in the context of Design Science Research and evaluate accordingly.

1. Introduction
As typically practiced today, systems security engineering (SSE) is a complex, manually intensive process, with implications for cost, time required, repeatability, and reproducibility [1][2]. A key driver in SSE
is the need to develop an understanding of mission/business risk due to cyber attack (henceforth we
simply say mission risk). An understanding of risk
then informs mitigation prioritization. Risk-based approaches are increasingly mandated in government
and industry with the arrival of standards such as the
US National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF) [3] and
the United States Department of Defense implementation of RMF [4].
Given the sometimes rapid evolution of mission,
system, and threat, such assessments are perishable
and must be periodically updated, with mitigations adjusted accordingly. Hence, the SSE community urgently needs ways to reduce cycle time and effort in
the SSE process.
While many SSE-related automation tools exist,
they tend to be narrowly focused in areas such as vulnerability scanning, e.g., Open VAS [5] and software
static analysis, e.g., ESC/Java [6]; or they focus on
capturing compliance/requirements data that subject
matter experts (SMEs) manually create [7][8].
Thus, a gap currently exists for tools to help the security engineer work from threat through to security
controls. Specifically, we have found that a gap exists
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for automation solutions that meet the requirements in
Table 1, which we derived from performing SSE over
a seven year period. The primary research question explored in this paper is whether creating an automated
tool that meets the requirements in Table 1 and thus
the gap identified, can provide SSEs with a measurable
head start in their work, allowing more efficient use of
their time to provide an engineering result at least as
good as or better than one derived via manual methods.
Table 1 – Requirements

ID
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9

Requirement
Analyze threat, mitigation, and entity data to estimate attack exposure.
Estimate attack consequence/impact based on criticality inputs (mission impact of compromises to data
on a specific asset).
Assess risk by generating risk plots of exposure vs.
criticality based on R1 and R2.
Recommend mitigations for entities based on risk assessed in R3 and a stated level of risk tolerance.
Be able to analyze systems in the early concept
phase as well as existing systems.
Produce results that are repeatable and reproducible.
Be usable in a range of environments, e.g., from enterprise IT settings to industrial control settings.
In terms of time required to complete SSE, do no
worse and ideally better than traditional manual SSE.
Allow engineers to produce an SSE solution that is
at least as good as one produced via manual SSE.

The research contribution of this paper is an entityand capability-centric framework called BluGen that
is intended to meet the requirements in Table 1.

Figure 1 – Applicability of BluGen

The terms entity and capability are defined below.
BluGen is primarily focused on SSE analysis steps
from threat to security control identification that are
part of the larger Systems Engineering (SE) process
(Figure 1).
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The theoretical foundation of BluGen rests on attack-centric risk assessment frameworks, as exemplified by NIST [9] and the International Standards Organization [10], where risk is a function of attack likelihood and mission consequence if the attack is successful. However, BluGen goes beyond attack-based
risk approaches, as discussed in Section 2, by focusing
on attacker/defender capabilities at the entity/asset
level, with an exposure metric replacing likelihood of
attack.
Figure 2 presents core BluGen constructs, with a
small sampling of entity types. As with other figures
in this paper, the figure is expressed using the Unified
Modeling Language [11]. BluGen analyzes various
entity types. The term “entity” refers to either missions
supported by a target cyber environment, cyber assets,
data processed, or the roles that people play in that environment. By “capability,” we refer to (1) a particular
proficiency, dubbed a “red capability,” that an attacker
can use to achieve a discrete step in a cyber attack or
(2) a particular proficiency, dubbed a “blue capability,” that can help to mitigate an attack. By “mitigate”
we mean the capability to identify, prevent, detect, respond, and/or recover [12] from the effects of one or
more red capabilities that are composed into a cyber
attack. Entities are the targets of capabilities, both red
and blue.

2. Background and Literature Review
In this section, we provide background and review
of the literature and describe how SSE has often been
superficially approached in the past, how SSE has
been in need of stronger processes and related automation, and how vulnerability- and attack-centric approaches have thus far proven difficult to automate.
SSE is an SE sub-discipline that has as its primary
goal the effective management of risk to mission objectives that could result from cyber-attacks against
systems supporting those missions [13][14][9].
Historically, standards organizations and governments have put forward standards and policies that
have not required strong SSE processes but have often
instead focused on a compliance-oriented approach
driven by checklists of security controls. For example,
Federal Information Processing Standard 199 [15],
CNSS Instruction 1253 [16], the DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP), and [17] have unintentionally encouraged superficial security engineering analysis by not requiring
substantive assessment of the cyber threat and risk that
then informed prioritized mitigation to objectively
bring the highest risks down to an acceptable level. In
addition to government standards, industry standards,
such as the Payment Card Industry Security Standards
Council [18], have similarly encouraged a compliance-oriented approach to security.
Government and industry have begun taking the
risks associated with the cyber threat more seriously in
recent years [19]. For example, International Standards Organization (ISO) Standard 27001 [10] has a
strong risk focus. In addition, the RMF now requires
that risk assessments of the cyber threat be carried out
as the basis for creating and prioritizing mitigation-related requirements [9][20].

Figure 2 – Core constructs used in BluGen

An example of a red capability is “Uses moderately
sophisticated social engineering techniques.” An example of a blue capability that could help to mitigate
this red capability is “Provides basic security-related
training to information system users.” The “entities”
in this example are human users who play roles in the
use/operation of a target information system.
The rest of this paper contains sections on background and related work, evaluation, artifacts, discussion, conclusions/future work, and references.

So while the need to carry out risk assessments and
select appropriate mitigations based on risk management decisions has now become widely acknowledged
and written into broad-based policies, it is also increasingly recognized that commonly used risk assessment
and mitigation engineering procedures tend to be excessively time consuming and potentially error-prone
because they are fundamentally manual processes carried out by SMEs; automation, including related models and analytics, is thus required [21][22][23].
The degree to which SSE risk and mitigation processes can be automated depends in part on the underlying approach taken to risk assessment and SSE.
Cyber assessment approaches have historically been
vulnerability-centric, attack-centric, or some combination of the two.
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In a vulnerability-centric assessment, e.g., [24] and
[25], risk is lowered through a process of discovering
and remediating (e.g., patching) vulnerabilities in the
affected systems. Vulnerability scanning tools such as
Nessus [26] and nmap [27] can assist in such assessments. Assessing risk based on identifying vulnerabilities, however, can at best identify only a small percentage of the total set of vulnerabilities in a system
due to the difficulty of identifying so-called zero day
vulnerabilities that are generally believed to be present
in abundance in complex cyber-intensive systems
[28]. Heart Bleed [29] and vulnerabilities present in
Adobe Flash, e.g., [30], are two examples of serious,
broad-based vulnerabilities that went undiscovered for
years. A further difficulty in taking a vulnerabilitycentric approach is that systems that contain vulnerabilities may be frozen in their configurations, with
patching disallowed because of the disruptive nature
of doing so and/or the loss of “certification” of altering
systems that have been approved for operation in a
particular locked down configuration. Common examples of such systems include military and critical
infrastructure systems.

3. Method

Attack-centric approaches (e.g., [9][31][32]) analyze risk by enumerating potential cyber attacks and
scoring each attack by likelihood of occurrence and
mission impact. As with approaches that attempt to
enumerate vulnerabilities, approaches that attempt to
enumerate potential attacks are challenging because of
the vast attack surfaces that complex cyber-intensive
systems expose.

We use the framework to evaluate the BluGen
framework itself, along with two models and four
methods contained within the framework and an instantiation of the framework.

Attack-based methodologies typically require
manual attack scoring that depends on cyber and mission SMEs for attack likelihood and impact scoring,
respectively. However, manual scoring does not scale.
For example, an attack-based risk analysis of a modest
system (e.g., 4 mission threads, 40 nodes, 4 attack vectors, 3 attack effects, and 4 data items/node on average) can require an upper bound of 7,680 (=440434)
unique attack contexts to be scored for likelihood and
impact.
Consequently, SMEs tend to consider a fraction of
the attack surface using small, typically non-random
samples with attendant concerns about how well such
samples generalize to the entire attack surface. In addition, such assessments are time consuming and subject to the effects of SME-bias in assigning scores
along ordinal scales. While some progress has been
made in automating impact scoring, e.g., [33] and [34],
approaches to automating attack likelihood scoring remain in their infancy. Furthermore, there is thus far
no clear-cut automation path that leads from attackcentric risk assessment to mitigation analysis.

We characterize and analyze BluGen in terms of
Design Science Research principles [35][36]. In particular, we use Hevner’s Information Systems Research Framework (Figure 3) to analyze BluGen, as
discussed in the validation section later.

Figure 3 – Hevner IS Research Framework

4. Artifact Description
This section describes BluGen artifacts, which are
summarized in Table 2.
Table 2 – Artifact Summary

Artifact Type
BluGen Artifact
Framework
BluGen itself
Models
Environment, Reference Catalog
Risk, Exposure, Criticality, MitigaMethods
tion
Instantiation
BluGen proof of concept
Following a discussion of the design search process that we followed to arrive at the artifacts in the
table, each of the BluGen artifacts is described.

Design Search
In terms of design as a search process for BluGen
[37], we note that SSEs using attack-centric approaches like Mission Information Risk Analysis
(MIRA) [38] tend to use some variant of the following
basic steps when carrying out risk assessment and mitigation processes manually. The presumption in these
steps is that the analyst will reference the Defense Science Board [19] threat tiers to conduct attack level of
effort scoring. The tiers range from I to VI, with lower
tier threat actors less capable than higher tier actors.
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1.

Identify a set of potential hypothetical attacks to
study against the target system environment. For
each attack, follow the steps below.

2.

Determine the worst case mission impact if the
attack is successful.

3.

Break the attack into the most likely steps and
determine the attack (red) capabilities needed in
each step of the attack.

4.

Set the overall attack level of effort/capability
score equal to the highest Defense Science Board
(DSB) tier associated with any of the red capabilities from step 3.

5.

For attacks with impact and effort scores that exceed the risk tolerance levels of mission/system
stakeholders, consider mitigation possibilities
for each red capability in the attack, as described
in the steps below.

6.

For each red capability, determine the blue capabilities needed to mitigate the red capability.

7.

Compare the blue capabilities already applied to
the entity or entities under consideration.

8.

If a needed blue capability is not already specified, then recommend that it be included.

We observed that the data and mappings associated with step 3, 6, 7, and 8 are invariant of the details
of any given target environment, assuming the entity
types in that environment are already known and
mapped. This observation led us to the idea that capturing such data and mappings in a “Reference Catalog” (Figure 4) and reusing the data across SSE analyses could save engineers time and lead to more consistent scoring. Taking this idea a step further, we believed that cross referencing this data (e.g., threats and
mitigations to entities and mitigations to threats) could
be automated through an analytic that mimics the steps
described earlier.

Figure 4 – Reference Catalog concept

The original concept behind Figure 4 was sketched
in [39]. As the figure shows, blue capabilities that mitigate red capabilities are mapped to those red capabilities in a many-to-many fashion. Similarly, blue and
red capabilities map many-to-many to entity types
based on relevance, as not every capability is applicable to every entity type.
In relating capabilities to individual cyber attacks,
we observe that attack capabilities possessed by a

threat actor can be composed in various combinations
and sequences to represent any possible cyber attack;
that is, capabilities are the “atoms” from which attacks
are constructed. We thus justify the capability-based
approach on the basis that if we are able to use blue
capabilities to mitigate (e.g., prevent or ameliorate the
effect) at the red capability level, then any attacks
composed from those red attack capabilities would be
thus disrupted.
Figure 5 illustrates the concept. The figure shows
five sample cyber attacks in the abstract broken down
into individual steps. For this example, each attack
uses “red capability 123” in one of its steps. Capability 123 might be, for example, “Can use brute force
searches to defeat strong hashes protected by strong
passwords.” Preventing or disrupting the success of
this particular capability would potentially prevent or
disrupt attacks composed in part from this capability.

Figure 5 – Disrupting attack and attack effects by disrupting component capabilities used in attack steps

As red capability mitigation coverage becomes
more complete, fewer attacks composed from those
capabilities have a chance of succeeding because
fewer unmitigated red capabilities are available from
which to compose the attacks.

Models
BluGen has two main models: an Environment
model and a Reference Catalog model.
Environment Model
The Environment model describes the target mission/cyber environment, any existing mitigations, and
related analysis parameters that BluGen analyzes for
risk and mitigations. The Environment model consists
of the following elements: threat level expected, risk
tolerance, environment description, and criticality, as
discussed below.
The threat level expected is an integer in the range
of one to six and represents a mapping to one of the
threat tiers defined in Gosler [19]. Risk tolerance consists of two metrics called exposure and criticality that
are expressed as percentages (range 0.0 to 1.0). The
metrics are described below. Whenever an entity’s exposure and criticality scores both exceed the corresponding risk tolerance values, BluGen recommends
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mitigations to bring entity exposure down below the
specified criticality level.
The environment description describes the target
cyber environment to be assessed by BluGen and contains three key sets: M, a set of missions; E, a set of
entities; and D, a set of data types. The entities in E
support the missions in M by processing data in D. Below we follow the convention that variables i, j, and k
index objects from E, M, and D respectively, with
 ei  E, 1 ≤ i ≤ |E|;
 mj  M, 1 ≤ j ≤ |M|; and
 dk  D, 1 ≤ k ≤ |D|.
Each entity instance consists of a name, an optional
description, an entity type, and a set of blue capabilities that have already been mapped to the entity. The
entity type must map onto one of the entity types found
in the Reference Catalog model (discussed below). If
a new entity type is encountered that is not in the Reference Catalog, it must be added and mapped accordingly. One type of entity is the mission entity. For mission entities, the environment description includes the
overall weight of each mission relative to the other directly supported missions; weights are typically determined by SMEs. Mission weights should sum to 1.0
for a given Environment model instance.
The criticality component of the Environment
model consists of a set of so-called “raw” criticality 4tuples. Each criticality triple, (mj, ei, dk), is a unique
combination of three values: a given mission, m, a
given entity, e, and a given mission data element, d.
Note that not every possible triple in the Cartesian
product of MED represents a viable combination, as
not every data type is associated every entity, and not
every entity is associated with every mission.
Associated with each raw criticality triple is a criticality score expressed as a percentage (range 0.0 to
1.0), with 0.0 meaning not mission-critical at all and
1.0 meaning maximal mission criticality. Criticality
means the worst case mission impact (“mission kill”)
if a cyber compromise were to occur in the context defined by the triple. For example, one of many criticality triples for a robot might be: (m=navigate, e=sensor,
d=location) and the worst case impact for the triple
might be found to be 1.0 (due to, say, an integrity attack on d=location in the m=navigate and e=sensor
context).
BluGen does not prescribe how raw criticality
scores are derived; the scores could be assigned by
SMEs or they could come about from running a mission performance model that can model cyber effects
and automatically determine related mission impacts,
e.g., [34]. The former would typically provide scores

along an ordinal scale, while the latter would typically
provide scores along a ratio scale based on mission
performance metrics. The latter is more desirable to
avoid potential SME bias.
Reference Catalog Model
The other BluGen model is the Reference Catalog,
which consists of (1) a set of red capabilities that attackers can compose into attacks, (2) a set of blue capabilities representing potential mitigations to red capabilities, (3) an entity type taxonomy, (4) a set of
mappings between blue and red capabilities, and (5) a
set of mappings between capabilities and entity types
in the taxonomy, as given in Figure 4. Mappings of
both types are many-to-many. A mapping of a blue
capability to a red capability means that the blue capability can, potentially in concert with other blue capabilities, help to mitigate the corresponding red capability. A mapping from red and blue capabilities to a
given asset type in the asset type taxonomy means that
the capability is relevant to (can affect) the corresponding asset type.
The red capability set can be taken from a threat
model, such as the DoD CIO/AT&L threat model [40].
The blue capability set can, in part, be derived from a
security control catalog, such as NIST 800-53 [41].
We expect the entity taxonomy to be organically
grown over time, though data mining against existing
sources may be done. For example, the National Vulnerability Database can provide an initial set of asset
types, where assets are one type of entity.

Methods
The BluGen framework supports four basic methods: Risk, Exposure, Criticality, and Mitigation.
Risk. The Risk (1) method computes mission risk
due to cyber effects (e.g., attacks) for each entity, ei,
and is the product of two additional methods, Exposure and Criticality, described below.

Exposure. The Exposure method computes how
“exposed” (open to attack) an entity is. For a given entity, ei, exposure is computed as given in (2).

In (2), trc(ei) is the total number of red capabilities
that threaten the type associated with entity ei, and
urc(ei) is the number of those red capabilities for which
no blue capability has currently been mapped, as identified in the environment description given in the Environment model. The Exposure method retrieves both
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red and blue capabilities by entity type from the Reference Catalog model.
The set of red capabilities that threaten a given entity type, trc(ei), is the union of the red capabilities directly mapped to the entity type and the red capabilities of the entity type’s parent, recursively up to the
root of the taxonomy. Figure 6 illustrates the concept
with an example. On the left hand side of the figure,
the red capabilities for a given CISCO router consists
of the red capabilities tied directly to the router plus
those for parents leading to the root (CISCO Router,
Router, and Network Device).

number of highly weighted missions rely on the entity
and a greater number of high criticality data types are
processed there. An overall asset’s criticality is computed from a set of incoming criticality scores supplied
from the Environment model.
To capture this notion mathematically, we compute
raw criticality, rc(ei), for each entity ei, as given in (3),
where mw(mj) is the mission weight for mission j, and
crit(ei,mj,dk) is the assigned mission criticality, a value
between 0 and 1 inclusive, for the triple (ei,mj,dk) that
comes in as input to BluGen from the Environment
model.

The final criticality/mission impact for a given entity, fc(ei), is the ratio of the raw criticality for the entity divided by the maximum raw criticality found
across the entire entity set (4).

Thus, criticality values are expressed as a percentage of the maximum entity criticality found in the environment description given in the Environment
model.
Figure 6 – Determining Exposure

The figure also highlights the fact that BluGen
can be useful early in the system development process
when the architecture is only known at a more abstract
level. In such cases, many asset types are identified in
generically terms (e.g., “router”) since design details
have not yet solidified. Nonetheless, threats can still
be assessed using the same process, but starting from
the more generic asset types closer to the root of the
entity type taxonomy.
The right side of Figure 6 illustrates how the Exposure method gathers blue capabilities for a given asset
instance. The Environment model allows one to specify an optional parent for a given entity instance. For
example, the parent of a workstation might be the segment of an enterprise network. So, in a manner analogous to determining red capabilities for an entity
type, the blue capabilities tied to a given entity instance are the union of the blue capabilities directly
mapped to the entity instance joined together with the
blue capabilities of the entity’s parent(s), recursively.
Unlike the Reference Catalog entity taxonomy, relationships in the environment form a directed acyclic
graph.
Criticality. The Criticality method computes the
worst case mission impact/criticality if an entity is attacked. An entity is more mission-critical if a greater

Mitigation. The Mitigation method computes the
recommended set of mitigations, entity-by-entity, required to bring risk down to an acceptable level, as
specified by the Environment model. For a given entity instance in the Environment model, we use the
Reference Catalog model to look up the red capabilities that map to the entity based on its type. We then
look up the blue capabilities that mitigate the red capabilities. If we call the resulting set M1 and we define
set M2 as the blue capabilities currently mapped to the
entity instance based on the environment description,
then the missing mitigations are just M1 – M2. The
set M3 defined by (c | c  M2 and c  M1) represents
superfluous blue capabilities that are currently mapped
to the entity instance but are not useful with respect to
the threat.

Instantiation
Figure 7 presents an architectural view of the
BluGen proof-of-concept instantiation. In this figure,
each method described earlier is realized through a
corresponding analytic (e.g., the Risk Method is realized via the “Risk Analytic” in Figure 7). The instantiation currently uses synthetic data for both the Environment and the Reference Catalog models. The frontend of the instantiation is implemented using Java and
JavaFX [42].
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row. The Remove column identifies blue capabilities
currently tied to the asset that do not contribute to the
anticipated threat; thus, one might consider removing
such blue capabilities to reduce overall system complexity and attack surface and to potentially reduce
costs.

Figure 7 – BluGen Instantiation

Figure 8 shows a sample risk plot produced by
BluGen. The plot is typical of a target mission/system
environment early in its lifecycle before mitigations
have been tied into the architecture. Thus, mean exposure levels tend to be high.
As Figure 8 shows, the data points represent entity
instances from the environment description, not individual cyber attacks, as are traditionally represented
on risk plots. Note that entities can include not just
hardware and software assets, but systems, networks,
the roles people play, and data types.

Figure 9 – Sample Mitigation Recommendations

5. Evaluation
Successful evaluation of BluGen is achieved by
demonstrating the degree to which BluGen meets the
requirements in Table 1. Before proceeding further,
we state what is perhaps obvious: that BluGen is dependent on the correctness of the Reference Catalog
and Environment models, the content of which is, at
least in part, SME-determined. SMEs must populate
the catalog contents with reasonable red/blue capabilities, entities, and related mappings. This section assumes that SMEs have populated the Reference Catalog with “correct” content, meaning that the relevant
entity types, red and blue capabilities, and required
mappings are in place. Table 3 describes how BluGen
meets the first seven requirements from Table 1.
Table 3 – Meeting Requirements

Figure 8 – Sample Instantiation Output

Similarly, Figure 9 shows a sample mitigation recommendations report automatically generated by
BluGen. For each entity instance, the report shows the
asset id and name, computed criticality and exposure
scores, recommendations on which mitigations (blue
capabilities) to add, and mitigations that could be removed because they do not map to any threat (red capability) per the Reference Catalog model. A given
score is shown in red typeface if it exceeds the corresponding risk tolerance.
Mitigations in the Add column are missing blue capabilities (mitigations) that are required to fully mitigate the anticipated threat, as defined by red capabilities tied to the asset type of the asset named on each

ID

R1

R2

R3
R4

How Met by BluGen
BluGen cross references red (threat) and blue (mitigation) capabilities with each other and to entities
in the environment. With this information, BluGen
computes an exposure metric, which is the ratio of
unmitigated threats to the total number of threats
that map by entity instance.
Based on the criticality inputs, BluGen rolls up and
computes mission criticality for each non-mission
entity; that is, assets, roles, and data. Criticality is a
measure of mission consequence if the entity is attacked.
For each entity analyzed, BluGen plots the asset on
a risk plot based on exposure and criticality scores.
BluGen recommends mitigations for entities that
score outside the risk tolerance region of the risk
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ID

R5

R6

R7

How Met by BluGen
plot. Mitigations are based on reducing the entity
exposure score to a level below the corresponding
risk tolerance parameter.
BluGen can analyze environment descriptions that
reflect high level descriptions of entities typically
known at the concept phase of a new program.
BluGen can also analyze detailed Environment
model descriptions typical of existing, deployed
systems. The only requirement is that the entity
types from any such models are mapped into the
Reference Catalog.
Holding constant both models (Environment and
Reference Catalog), we assert repeatability of
BluGen results based on the fact that BluGen’s
method implementations as algorithms will mechanically produce the same outputs given the same
inputs. We do not analyze whether the same SSE
team using BluGen to analyze the same model data
on two different occasions will produce a repeatable result, as the focus of this paper is on BluGen
itself. However, our (untested) hypothesis is that
the results would be more repeatable compared to
having the same team repeat an SSE analysis without the benefit of BluGen automation. This belief
is based on the fact that the SSE team will have less
analysis to do because of the substantial head start
that BluGen offers. We make a similar argument
for reproducibility. Variability in the results of two
different teams analyzing the same target environment with the same Reference Catalog will be due
to team differences.
The entity type taxonomy in the Reference Catalog
model (Figure 6) is general enough to accommodate traditional IT assets as well as specialized asset
types found in industrial control settings. Over
time, the entity type taxonomy is expected to expand in depth and in breadth, to accommodate new
types of entities encountered in the different environments where BluGen is employed.

Our plan for evaluation of requirements 8 and 9 requires execution of an experiment. The experiment is
based on a two-group, posttest-only, randomized experimental design [44]. While the experimental design has been articulated, space considerations prevent
full description in the current paper.
Evaluation per Hevner DSRM Guidelines
Table 4 briefly summarizes BluGen in terms of the
guidelines from Hevner.
Table 4 – Design Science Research Guidelines

Guideline

Discussion

1 - Design as an BluGen is described in terms of an interartifact
related set of designed artifacts.
2 - Problem relevance

Frameworks such as RMF now require organizations within the US government to

Guideline

Discussion
assess and manage cyber risk to missions.
We expect the number of required assessments to grow non-linearly for the foreseeable future, thus making purely manual
SSE untenable.

3 - Design eval- We have evaluated 7 of 9 requirements
uation
with 2 requirements pending.
4 - Research
contributions

Our contribution is the BluGen framework
and related artifacts, which address the requirements in Table 1

5 - Research rigor

BluGen builds upon attack-centric risks
assessment frameworks, as exemplified by
NIST 800-30.

6 - Design as
search

We considered various approaches (e.g.,
vulnerability, attack, and capability), and
we factored out common steps carried out
by SSEs that do not change from assessment to assessment.

7 - Research
communication

This paper is a first step in communicating
BluGen.

6. Discussion
As of this writing, the experiment mentioned in the
previous section has not been executed. A future paper
will describe and discuss experimental results.
It has not escaped notice that BluGen, while intended initially to serve the defensive cyber community could, in a trivial reformulation, be of use to those
performing red team and penetration testing duties. In
a reformulated BluGen (i.e., “RedGen”), the perspectives are flipped, so, for example, the risk plot of
BluGen becomes an “attack attractiveness” plot, with
the exposure axis relabeled as the “opportunity” axis,
as the plot highlights entities that have high exposure
and thus represent potentially easy opportunity for attacks for high impact attacks.

7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we described BluGen, an analytic
framework that generates risk plots and recommends
prioritized mitigations for a target mission/system environment based on a stated level of threat and risk tolerance.
Assuming the overall approach passes experimental validation, a possible future direction could be
to prepare the BluGen Environment model input via
automated means (today, model population is typically
carried out manually). Both system and mission mapping techniques would be required.
The Reference Catalog mappings in the current
BluGen instantiation were created by a small SME
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team at Johns Hopkins APL. A future goal is to allow
the larger cybersecurity community to peer review,
update, and, most importantly, reuse the Reference
Catalog as a shared community resource. Automated
generation of mappings within the Reference Catalog
is another area of possible exploration, using, for example, a supervised machine learning approach.
Currently, the mapping of mitigations to threats allows for a single “solution” to mitigate a given set of
threats. An enriched catalog could capture multiple alternative solutions, that is, different mitigation approaches to address the same set of threats. Each solution could carry with it distinguishing attributes,
such as estimates of solution acquisition cost, operational cost, mission performance cost, implementation
complexity, and strength. This setup would then allow
an automated form of trade-space analysis based on a
given set of attribute value inputs.
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